SUBSCRIBE TO THE NIXON CENTER EMAIL BULLETIN
"Anti-Americanism In Europe: An Update"
A Panel Discussion
November 4, 2002
The Nixon Center, Washington DC
Four specialists on transatlantic relations and European issues argued during a Nixon Center seminar that many American commentators have substantially overstated the levels of anti-American sentiment in European nations today. They emphasized that while there is palpable European opposition to American policies, this opposition is much weaker than earlier concerns about US missile deployments in the 1980’s or the Vietnam War. The panel included Rosemary Hollis, Head of Middle East Programs at the Royal Institute for International Affairs, Craig Kennedy, President of the German Marshall Fund, Christopher Makins, President of the Atlantic Counsel of the United States, and Simon Serfaty, Director of European Programs at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. The Nixon Center’s Director of Regional Strategic Programs, Geoffrey Kemp, moderated the discussion.
Craig Kennedy began the discussion by stating that while there are strong, critical feelings in Europe about the United States, grouping these sentiments under the general heading of anti-Americanism belies the nuances and complexities that in fact characterize the European perceptions of American policies. Historically, there have been three types of anti-Americanism held by Europeans. The first of these is cultural and manifests itself in the distaste of many Europeans for what they perceive to be the mass-media-influenced, empty culture of America. The second is an economic anti-Americanism which is based on the perception of American dominance of the global economy. The third is political, stemming from the belief that as the world’s sole superpower, America imposes its will and ideology on whomever it pleases.
Mr. Kennedy noted that, based on extensive polling research of Europeans, there is little evidence to suggest that either the cultural or the economic anti-Americanism persist across Europe today. The real issues are political. Europeans perceive that America is by far the predominant power in the world, and this shapes the way they look world events. Mr. Kennedy cited the oft-mentioned fact that many in Europe perceived at least some measure of causality or association between the events of September 11th and American foreign policy. While many Americans were shocked and discouraged by the number of Europeans holding this view (55%), Mr. Kennedy asserted that this is not necessarily an example of anti-Americanism. Rather, because many Europeans "view the United States as having almost unlimited power, it’s easy to think that almost anything in the world is somehow connected with the use of it". Furthermore, the US has long been the country to which many Europeans felt the closest or towards which they had the warmest feelings. Mr. Kennedy also noted that the two sides have very different perceptions of what UN involvement in international actions means, particularly with regard to Iraq. In Europe, it connotes approval, sanction and legitimacy whereas in the US it implies allies, friends, and assistance. Thus, UN involvement in any campaign against Iraq is the most important factor for most Europeans.
However, Mr. Kennedy believes that it is clear that Europeans have very ambivalent feelings about the United States and the way that it uses power. To a significant extent, European ambivalence is centered on President Bush and his policies. Europeans are consistently more critical of Bush’s foreign policy than Americans by a significant margin, particularly on the topic of Israel-Palestine. Nevertheless, when asked whether they want the United States to be more involved in the Middle East peace process, and whether Europe and America should cooperate more on similarly important issues, "an overwhelming number of Europeans say ‘yes’". Thus in conclusion, Mr. Kennedy stated that polling evidence does not support the notion of strong, generalized anti-Americanism across-the-board.
Rosemary Hollis argued that European criticisms of America are based on what America does rather than what it is. Ironically, Dr. Hollis proposed that anti-Americanism is more likely to result when Americans accuse their transatlantic counterparts of basing their positions not on substantive policy considerations or ideological disagreements, but merely on anti-American sentiments. The European reluctance to act militarily and the preference for legalistic action stem from the historical lessons that Europeans have collectively learned, namely the horrific, continent-wide wars that periodically ravaged the region. Furthermore, European priorities are centered around challenges to the EU such as enlargement, the reform of decision-making structures, improvements in defense capabilities, inter-EU relations, and economic issues such as unemployment and the recent devastating Central European floods. The Europeans get nervous when it appears to them that the US is about to "trash international law". Dr. Hollis emphasized that the criticisms of the European allies are serious and should be listened to. On the issue of war with Iraq, America will have to be concern itself much more with anti-Americanism in the Middle East than in Europe.
Christopher Makins added that there is a need for a historical perspective on the subject of anti-Americanism. The post-war period saw similar differences of opinion on Europe’s role in the world to the one we see now. The Vietnam War era and the deployment of intermediate-range nuclear forces on the European continent caused greater outbursts of anti-Americanism than is evident now but none led to a serious breach of the alliance. The only manifest anti-Americanism in Europe today resides with what Mr. Makins referred to as "fringe elements" of the far right and far left. On the left, the US is perceived as the main engine of globalization and that globalization is bad. On the right, nationalistic elements resist "Americanization" of their respective cultures. Finally, the US and Europe have always disagreed on the Middle East, going back to the end of WWI and the European reapportionment of the Ottoman Empire.
Furthermore, Mr. Makins felt that there are Americans who use allegations of anti-Americanism to further particular agendas and who do not make appropriate distinctions between opposition to individual American policies and general anti-Americanism. In fact, there are those in the US who could be called anti-European, which, unlike anti-Americanism, is a relatively new phenomenon. But it is important to remember, that despite differences, America and Europe are still closer to each other than to any other region. Mr. Makins stated that as the two sides continue to develop their respective policies in the post-September 11th world, the differences will be worked out. Though there have not been any breakthroughs, none should be expected without efforts to work out policy positions and reconstitute a transatlantic dialogue. On the issue of Iraq, Mr. Makins felt it more likely that President Bush would be able to procure a UN resolution than not, and thus solidify support from the majority of European governments. However, if Mr. Bush were not able to secure UN support and went ahead anyway, Mr. Makins felt that he would still find support amongst European governments but it would be less enthusiastic and more costly for them at home. In the end, what happens during or after the war may be just as, if not more, important to Europeans than the circumstances through which it commences.
Simon Serfaty rounded off the discussion by addressing points made by his colleagues. First, he agreed with the previous speakers that by and large, anti-Americanism in Europe is a myth. However he felt that Europeans resent America’s achievement, particularly as the European nation-state is being eroded and Europe is becoming, as he sees it, more like America. This resentment fuels the perception of anti-Americanism in Europe. However, while European anti-Americanism is overstated, he felt that anti-Europeanism in America is very real, particularly amongst those in America who accuse their transatlantic counterparts of the same sentiment.
Second, the resentment by Europeans of President Bush is irrelevant because Europeans have always hated new American presidents. Third, September 11th introduced something different in the debate between Europe and America, a "clash of histories". Dr. Serfaty contended that Europeans do not understand the events of September 11th the way Americans do. Europeans are less sensitive to the casualty figures of the terrorist attacks in America because of their own massive losses sustained on all sides during the continental wars. And whereas America has endured only limited terrorism on its home soil, Europeans have more experience with foreign terror. Furthermore, Europeans feel they have reinvented themselves as a result of their experiences and so view order differently than Americans, particularly with respect to the use of military force, subscribing to the belief that it "will get us in but it won’t get us out". However, Dr. Serfaty stated that the two sides should not let these differences impede the two regions’ respective goals and involvement in international affairs Ultimately, "the goal is not to do everything together but together to do everything".
This Program Brief was prepared by Nixon Center Intern Tom Rickers.
