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Program Brief,
vol. 7, #21
© The Nixon Center 2001
"What to Do about
Iraq?: American, Arab, and Israeli Perspectives"
A Nixon Center Briefing
November 29,
2001
The Nixon Center, Washington, DC
As the war on
terrorism continues to be waged in Afghanistan, policy experts are debating
where Phase II of the war should take place. Should Saddam Hussein’s regime in
Iraq be the next target? Since Iraq continues to develop weapons of mass
destruction and refuses to allow UN arms inspectors into the country there are
good reasons to carry the war to Baghdad. Although the confrontation in
Afghanistan against Taliban and Al-Qaeda forces is not complete, the question of
"what to do about Iraq?" is timely. Some suggest applying to Iraq a
campaign similar to that being executed in Afghanistan with a massive air
campaign and small elite units on the ground. However with most Muslim countries
openly objecting to an operation against Iraq the realistic options against
Saddam remain elusive.
On November 29 a
distinguished group of experts addressed these questions at a Nixon Center
luncheon entitled, "What to Do about Iraq?: American, Arab, and Israeli
Perspectives." The speakers included R. James Woolsey, former Director
of Central Intelligence; Ken Pollack, Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign
Relations; Hisham Milhem, Washington Correspondent for As-Safir, a Lebanese
newspaper; Shai Feldman, Head of the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies at
Tel-Aviv University. The meeting was moderated by Geoffrey Kemp, Director of
Regional Strategic Programs at The Nixon Center.
"Saddam
Hussein’s regime is irredeemable and its demise is in everyone’s best
interest," stated Dr. Kemp to begin the discussion, " the issue for
debate then is not about Saddam Hussein, but how and when to replace the regime
and ensure a stable, humane Iraq free of weapons of mass destruction." If
the war on terrorism is carried over to Iraq, the removal of Saddam’s regime
will be the key issue, and there was a general consensus by the panelists that
this must be the primary objective. R. James Woolsey stated, "The mission
is to remove the Ba’athist regime, not Saddam as an individual, you don’t
want to leave Uday or Qussay… (Saddam’s sons)It would not be progress to get
rid of Saddam alone. It’s the regime, stupid."
Although the
consensus in the United States is to eventually remove Saddam there are question
marks in mustering moderate Arab support. "Our allies are opposed to Iraqi
intervention," explained Mr. Pollack, " without support from our
allies it will be difficult to mount operations." One of the keys in the
campaign in Afghanistan has been access to neighboring countries like Uzbekistan
and Pakistan. Therefore several panelists said it is essential to gain support
from our friends and allies in the region. Dr. Feldman articulated Israel’s
position clearly, "Israel will do whatever it is asked to do." He
further explained that Israel would exercise a similar restraint to the one
shown in Desert Storm. "It was wise not to act 10 years ago, why act
now?" However Dr. Feldman did address a scenario that Israel would have to
strongly consider responding to that is unlike Desert Storm. "Since the
United States did not pursue Baghdad that time around (Desert Storm), Saddam
Hussein did not reach the point of desperation…The question that we have to
face is what if he does face the point of desperation. Would the same deterrence
that kept Saddam Hussein from using the 42 chemical warheads that we
subsequently confirmed at the time, keep deter Saddam today were he to reach the
point of desperation?"
The most
difficult task however rests in gaining support of Muslim countries especially
the states bordering Iraq. "Turkey is an essential ally in the campaign. It
borders Iraq and would be a path in." said Mr. Woolsey. Hisham Milhem
agreed with Mr. Woolsey’s assessment of Turkey’s importance, but expressed
uncertainty as to whether Turkey would support the United States, " I am
not sure Turkey would allow the U.S. to station troops there. Turkey has an
economic interest in Iraq, and Iraq prevents the Northern Kurds from being a
pain." Mr. Milhem further elaborated his doubt that other crucial allies
would join a new coalition against Iraq, " Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Kuwait
would be reluctant to provide overt support." Mr. Milhem did go on to say
these countries would possibly support the United States if the operation lasted
only a few weeks. Absent this guarantee though, Mr. Milhem said they won’t
gamble. Mr. Woolsey concurred that it might be difficult to gain support, but
argued action against Iraq should not be contingent upon allies support.
"Certainty breeds support. The right approach is to go and say (to our
Allies) we are going to destroy the Ba’athist regime, if there is something
you can do to help we would like your assistance. If you can’t help we would
like you to be quiet about the whole thing because we are going to do it
anyway."
Irrespective of
which allies would be in a coalition against Iraq, another question concerned
what a military operation against Iraq would look like. Mr. Woolsey emphasized
the role air power has played in Afghanistan as a starting point for an
offensive in Iraq and explained that an air campaign today in Iraq would be
different than the one waged in Iraq over 10 years ago. "In the Gulf War
10% of our weapons were smart weapons, in Afghanistan 70% have been smart
weapons. The reason hundreds of sorties were not necessary was because virtually
every bomb has counted and you have seen it in the demoralized faces of the
Taliban." Mr. Milhem worried that although an air campaign could be
successful, the opposition forces in Iraq would not be the same as the Northern
Alliance. " Saddam’s regime is far stronger than the Taliban, and the
Iraqi opposition is far weaker than the Northern Alliance. The opposition is not
going to turn into a Kurdish Northern Alliance." Furthermore, Milhem
explained, the Iraqi opposition still feels the burn of American withdrawal in
1991 just when the opposition to Saddam was mounting. Mr. Woolsey agreed,
"The decision not to support the opposition was a bad idea, 14 out of 18
provinces were opposing Saddam." Mr. Milhem and Mr. Woolsey both said it
would be difficult to regain the trust of the opposition.
Mr. Pollack
outlined three operations options currently being discussed, applying the Afghan
model to Iraq. Invading, installing a new regime, and bolstering containment of
Iraq. Uncertain of enough allied support to mount an operation similar to the
one in Afghanistan, Pollack asserted, "We need to start thinking about the
option of invasion (of Iraq) very seriously. It is a serious option, and as far
as I am concerned it would be the best thing we could do. It would assure us of
getting rid of Saddam Hussein and ensure there is a stable Iraq," Mr.
Pollack went on to explain that while this option could result in higher
casualties, it is the only course of action to take. "It is the only
guarantee we have to get rid of Saddam. If he gets a nuke, we will wish we would
have invaded."
This Program Brief was prepared by Nixon Center staff member
Gregory A. Fedor.
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